This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank's approximating model, the paper's main …ndings are as follows. First, a central bank's credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can bene…t from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.
Introduction
On August 9, 2011, against a background of heightened volatility in global …nancial markets, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve issued a monetary policy statement that read "The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions-including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for in ‡ation over the medium run-are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013." This passage replaced the language in statements issued since December 16, 2008 , which said "The Committee continues to anticipate that economic conditions-including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for in ‡ation over the medium run-are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period." Similar passages can be found in more recent statements. Although the precise language has changed, each passage is notable for presenting households, …rms, and investors with forward-guidance about monetary policy, guidance provided in an e¤ort to leverage credibility in order to stimulate current economic activity. The passages are also notable in that the forward guidance is conditioned on a forecast for in ‡ation and resource utilization, or slack. As a consequence, the e¤ectiveness of the forward-guidance hinges on the Federal Reserve's credibility and on the potential for the forecasting model to be misspeci…ed.
We consider the decision problem facing an imperfectly-credible central bank that seeks robustness to model uncertainty and explore the following questions. How important is credibility for monetary policy and macroeconomic outcomes? Does a central bank's desire for robustness help or hinder policymaking? How do imperfect credibility and robustness a¤ect the forward-guidance that central bank's provide? The answers to these questions are important when central banks are relying increasingly on their credibility and on forwardguidance to gain leverage over current economic outcomes, all-the-while model uncertainty remains an ongoing concern.
To model credibility, we adopt the quasi-commitment approach developed by Roberds (1987) , Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) . According to this literature a policymaker's credibility is associated with the probability that the promises it makes about future policy will be honored. Policymakers that have no credibility honor their promises with probability zero and conduct discretionary policy. Policymakers that have imperfect credibility honor their promises with probabilities between zero and one, with higher probabilities indicating higher credibility and a probability of one indicating commit-ment. Central banks desire higher levels of credibility because a lack of credibility leads to a (time-consistent) equilibrium characterized by a discretionary in ‡ation bias and/or a discretionary stabilization bias. Under the former, the central bank, faced with the goals of keeping unemployment close to the natural rate and in ‡ation close to target, succumbs to a short-run incentive to create surprise in ‡ation with permanently higher in ‡ation and no reduction in the unemployment rate the equilibrium outcome (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . Under the latter, the central bank, seeking to stabilize output and in ‡ation e¢ ciently in response to supply shocks, has an incentive to promise future policy interventions that mitigate the size of today's policy intervention, without having an incentive to subsequently deliver on those promises (Svensson, 1997; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999) . The ine¢ ciencies associated with both biases are overcome when credibility is perfect.
In addition to imperfect credibility, the central bank that we study is concerned about model misspeci…cation. To model the central bank's concern for model misspeci…cation we adopt the robust control approach advanced by Hansen and Sargent (2008) . According to the robust control literature, a policymaker that desires robustness against model misspeci…cation will formulate policy in the context of a potentially distorted, or misspeci…ed, approximating model so as to guard against the worst permissible misspeci…cation. Through this mechanism the policymaker is able to conduct model-based policy while also expressing distrust in its model.
After developing the decision problem confronting an imperfectly credibility policymaker that seeks robustness to model uncertainty and presenting its solution, we use the Smets and Wouters (2007) model to examine the e¤ects that imperfect credibility and robustness have on optimal policymaking. We employ the Smets and Wouters (2007) model for our analysis because it is widely understood, it forms the basis for many other models, and it is thought to …t U.S. data well; in these respects it can usefully be viewed as the central bank's approximating model. Moreover, the Smets-Wouters model contains a broad array of shocks whose presence provides ample cover for model misspeci…cation and it is forward-looking allowing policy announcements and central bank credibility to potentially play important roles.
A further advantage to using the Smets-Wouters model is that our qualitative …ndings are likely to generalize to the many related models.
The main lessons that emerge are the following. First, a central bank's credibility gives it a powerful lever for managing private-sector expectations and for stabilizing the economy.
Second, when a central bank has low credibility the economy can bene…t from the central bank's desire for robustness. Put di¤erently, the central bank's desire for robustness can act somewhat as a substitute for credibility when credibility is low. This result emerges because a robust central bank is directed to respond aggressively to stabilize in ‡ation following shocks, pursuing a policy that would ordinarily be infeasible for a central bank that lacks credibility.
Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility produce big declines in policy performance, giving rise to a form of discretionary stabilization bias. The over-riding lesson that emerges from this analysis is that credibility is extremely valuable for central banks, both when the model is known to be correctly speci…ed and when it is suspected that it is not.
In addition to the work of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , Debortoli and Nunes (2010) , and Hansen and Sargent (2008) , this paper is related to Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010) and Kasa (2002) . However, where Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010) focus on the interaction between imperfect credibility and the zero-bound on nominal interest rates, we focus on the interaction between imperfect credibility and model uncertainty. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with theirs in-so-much as we too …nd that policymakers tend to make more extreme policy announcements as their credibility declines. Like ourselves, Kasa The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the decision problem facing a central bank that seeks to guard against model misspeci…cation while endowed with imperfect credibility. Section 3 establishes the connection between robust control and risk-sensitive preferences for this class of quasi-commitment decision problems. Section 4 summarizes and analyzes the Smets-Wouters model that serves as our laboratory for analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Robustness and imperfect credibility
In this section we describe a linear-quadratic planning problem and characterize its solution.
This planning problem involves constraints that contain non-predetermined variables and is related to the commitment problems that are solved routinely in the monetary policy literature, while di¤ering in two important respects. First, the decisionmaking environment is one in which the policymaker has imperfect credibility. Imperfect credibility is modeled according to the quasi-commitment literature which allows the policymaker to stochastically default, reoptimizing its plan at stochastic intervals. In this aspect, the analysis builds on work by Roberds (1987) , Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) .
Second, the decisionmaking environment is one in which the policymaker has doubts about its model and seeks a policy that is robust in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2008) . In this aspect, the analysis is related to work by Giordani and Söderlind (2004) , Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 16) , and Dennis (2008 Dennis ( , 2010 .
The two key parameters in the decision problem that we formulate are 2 [0; 1], which governs the policymaker's credibility, and 2 [ ; 1), which governs the policymaker's distrust in its model. Importantly, many standard decisionmaking problems emerge as special cases of this decision problem. Speci…cally, for di¤erent limiting values of and the decision problem simpli…es to nonrobust commitment ( " 1, " 1), nonrobust discretion ( " 1, 
The approximating model
The economy consists of households, …rms, and a policymaker, which in our application is a central bank. All agents are assumed to share an approximating model that they believe comes closest to describing the process governing economic outcomes. According to this approximating model, an n 1 vector of endogenous variables, z t , consisting of n 1 predetermined variables, x t , and n 2 (n 2 = n n 1 ) nonpredetermined variables, y t , evolves over time according to
where u t is a p 1 vector of policy control variables and are conformable with x t , y t , and u t as necessary while the matrix C 1 is constructed to ensure that " xt has the identity matrix as its variance-covariance matrix. The operator E t represents the private sector's mathematical expectation operator conditional upon period t information.
Equation (2) accommodates a leading matrix A 0 that need not have full rank.
Equations (1) and (2) are standard constraints in linear-quadratic decision problems in which private agents are forward-looking and policy is conducted under either commitment or discretion (Currie and Levine, 1993) or under timeless-perspective commitment (Woodford, 2010; Svensson, 2010) . Of course, when policy is conducted under discretion equations (1) and (2) must be augmented with an equation of the form
where H is determined in equilibrium, to account to the fact that private-sector expectations depend only on the state variables in a Markov-perfect (and hence time-consistent) equilibrium (Kydland and Prescott, 1977 ).
Introducing imperfect credibility
Building on Roberds (1987 where denotes the mean of the random variable t , which obeys a Bernoulli distribution.
The underlying environment can be interpreted several ways. One interpretation is that the environment is one in which the policymaker makes announcements about future policy with all agents (including the policymaker) making decisions knowing that the announced policy will only be implemented with probability . An alternative interpretation is that the environment is one in which policymakers can credibly commit to a state-contingent plan, or policy, for the duration of their tenure, but where each policymaker's tenure is uncertain, governed by the outcome of a sequence of i:i:d: draws of the random variable t . Accordingly, if t = 1, then the incumbent-policymaker's tenure continues in period t, whereas if t = 0, then the incumbent-policymaker's tenure ends at the beginning of period t. In the event that the incumbent-policymaker's tenure ends, that policymaker is replaced by another with identical preferences, but that is not beholden to honor the policies announced by any of its predecessors. Under either interpretation, = 1 corresponds to commitment, = 0 corresponds to discretion, and 2 (0; 1) corresponds to a form of limited commitment or imperfect credibility.
At the start of every period a draw for t is received and is observed by all agents. In forming their period-t expectations of y t+1 , therefore, private agents take into account uncertainty about the shocks hitting the economy and uncertainty about whether the incumbent or a new policymaker will be conducting policy in period t + 1. Assuming that the Bernoulli distribution that governs t is independent of the probability density that governs the innovations, " xt , equation (2) can be written as
where the expectation E t y t+1 j t+1 = 0 is governed by an expression that takes the form of equation (3). To accommodate the policymaker's concerns, distortions, or speci…cation errors, v t+1 , are introduced, disguised by the innovations, " xt+1 . A consequence of the speci…cation errors is that equation (1) in the approximating model becomes
Introducing model uncertainty
in the "distorted" model and that equation (2) in the approximating model becomes
in the distorted model, where H and C 2 have yet to be determined. In equation (6), H characterizes the relationship between the non-predetermined variables, y t , and the predetermined variables, x t , in the event that a reoptimization occurs ( t = 0) while C 2 summarizes how errors in forecasting the non-predetermined variables (i.e. y t+1 j t+1 = 1 E t y t+1 j t+1 = 1 ) are related to the innovations, " xt+1 . More compactly, and in obvious notation, equation (6) can be written as
The sequence of speci…cation errors, fv s+1 g 1 s=t is constrained to satisfy the boundedness condition
where
It is the satisfaction of this boundedness condition that de…nes the sense in which the approximating model, summarized by equations (1)- (2), is a good one. When ! = 0, the policymaker trusts the approximating model and conducts policy as if the approximating model is correct. As ! increases, however, the policymaker increasingly suspects that the approximating model is misspeci…ed. For ! > !, the policymaker's doubts about the approximating model are such that it no longer views the approximating model to be a good representation of the data-generating process.
The robust decision problem with imperfect credibility
The policymaker's objective function is given by the loss function
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and L (x s ; y s ; u s ) is quadratic and convex to the origin.
As noted earlier, in the event that t = 1, the incumbent policymaker's tenure continues.
However, in the event that t = 0, the period-t decision problem for the newly-appointed policymaker is to choose fu s g 1 s=t to minimize and fv s+1 g 1 s=t to maximize equation (9) subject to equations (5), (7), and (8), and x t known. According to this decision problem, to guard against the speci…cation errors that it fears, the robust policymaker formulates policy subject to the distorted model with the mind-set that the speci…cation errors will be as damaging as possible, a view operationalized via the metaphor that fv s+1 g 1 s=t is chosen by a …ctitious evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed to those of the policymaker. Following Hansen and Sargent (2008) , this constraint problem can be replaced with an equivalent multiplier problem, in which
, is maximized with respect to fv s+1 g 1 s=t and minimized with respect to fu s g 1 s=t , subject to equations (5) and (7), and x t known. The multiplier, or robustness parameter, , represents the shadow price of a marginal relaxation in the boundedness condition, equation (8) . Larger values for , which correspond to smaller values of !, signify greater con…dence in the adequacy of the approximating model. Of course, in the limit as " 1, the nonrobust decision problem is restored.
From the Lagrange function
we construct the "dual" loss function
where s = s , allowing equation (11) to be expressed as
Now de…ning e X t = x 
in which
with S = I 0 (and S 1 representing the generalized left inverse of S), subject to e X t+1 = e A e X t + e Be u t + e Cv t+1 + e C" xt+1 :
In equation (16) , the system matrices are given by e A = A 11 0 0 0 , e B = A 12 B 1 0 0 0 I , and e C = C 1 0 .
The decision problem described by equations (14)- (16) is essentially an optimal linear regulator problem that can be solved using standard methods. From its solution it is straightforward to recover updated terms for H and C 2 . Beginning with conjectured values for H and C 2 , iterating to convergence delivers the worst-case decision rules and the worst-case equilibrium law-of-motion. 1 With the worst-case equilibrium in hand, it is straightforward to recover the approximating equilibrium. In the approximating equilibrium, although the policymaker employs its robust decision rule, the approximating model is taken to be correctly speci…ed.
The approximating equilibrium gives us an equilibrium law-of-motion
and a collection of decision rules
Notice that the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating equilibrium are both expressed in terms of a state vector that includes the multipliers, t 1 . Accordingly, in the event that t = 0 the approximating equilibrium is governed by equations (17)- (18), but with
A risk-sensitive formulation
For linear-quadratic in…nite-horizon discounted stochastic models in which the constraints do not contain nonpredetermined variables, Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 2) show that the decision rule that solves the robust control problem also solves an alternative in…nite-horizon discounted stochastic decision problem in which the policymaker does not fear model misspeci…cation, but instead has risk-sensitive preferences (Whittle, 1990) . We extend that result to models whose constraints do contain nonpredetermined variables, focusing here on the case where policy is conducted with discretion. The general case where the constraints contain nonpredetermined variables and policy is conducted with quasi-commitment is treated in Appendix A.
The connection between the robust control formulation and the risk-sensitive preferences formulation is useful for several reasons. It links the robust control problem to ambiguity/uncertainty aversion and o¤ers a more general interpretation of the decision problem as a consequence. Speci…cally, the policymaker's doubts about the model lead to behavior that can equivalently be generated by additional sensitivity to risk (Whittle, 1990 ), Epstein-Zinpreferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989), or ambiguity aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 ).
With policy conducted under pure discretion ( = 0), it follows from equation (6) that the aggregate reaction function for the nonpredetermined variables can be written as
Equation (19) applies under both the approximating model and the distorted model. Given equation (19) , the law-of-motion for the predetermined variables in the approximating model and in the distorted model are
and
respectively.
The risk-sensitive formulation employs equation (20) (because the policymaker trusts the model), and leads to the Bellman-equation
where the risk-sensitivity parameter satis…es 0 and V is positive semi-de…nite. Employing a result from Jacobson (1973), equation (22) is equivalent to
In contrast, the robust-control formulation employs equation (21) (because the policymaker distrusts the model), and leads to the Bellman-equation
Performing the inner-maximization gives
Substituting equations (25) and (21) into equation (24) results in 
The model in summary
To examine robust policymaking with imperfect credibility we use as our approximating model the Smets and Wouters (2007) model for the U.S. We use this model for several reasons.
First, the model has been found to provide a reasonably good description of U.S. economic outcomes. Second, the model forms the basis for many related models and its widespread usage, together with its empirical support, make it a sensible choice. Third, the model's structure accommodates many shocks, which from the robust control perspective, represent sources of potential misspeci…cation. Fourth, private agents are forward-looking, allowing central-bank credibility to in ‡uence private-sector decisionmaking.
Because the Smets and Wouters (2007) model is widely known, we describe only its main characteristics here and refer interested readers to the original text. The economy is populated by three types of agents: households, …rms, and a central bank. Households own the capital stock and the equity in …rms and receive income from dividends and from renting capital and supplying labor to …rms. Households use their income to purchase goods that they allocate between consumption and investment in order to maximize expected lifetime utility.
Goods allocated to investment augment the capital stock, subject to a resource cost associated with changing the investment- ‡ow. Households gain utility from consumption (subject to an external consumption habit) and from leisure, and they are monopolistically competitive suppliers of their labor, setting their wage subject to a Calvo-style wage rigidity. Those households that are unable to change their wage in a given period are assumed to index their wage to lagged aggregate in ‡ation. On the production side, …rms are monopolistically competitive; they rent capital and hire labor and produce according to a constant-returns
Cobb-Douglas production function. Firms choose how much capital and labor to employ and set prices in order to maximize the expected present discounted value of the …rm, subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity and price indexation. Pro…ts are returned to households in the form of a lump-sum dividend. Finally, the goods that …rms produce are combined according to a Kimball (1995) technology to produce a …nal good that is sold to households in a perfectly competitive market.
Although Smets and Wouters (2007) characterize monetary policy in terms of an estimated
Taylor-type rule, our focus is on optimal policymaking. Accordingly, we take the "primal" approach and replace their estimated policy rule with one chosen in order to minimize the following loss function
where t denotes annualized quarterly in ‡ation, y t denotes output, y f t denotes ‡ex-price output, and y t y f t denotes the output gap. The parameter 2 [0; 1) governs the weight assigned to stabilizing the output gap relative to stabilizing in ‡ation. The model is loglinearized about a zero-in ‡ation balanced growth path and is subject to six shocks, including those to the aggregate production technology, the investment-speci…c production technology, and to the price and wage markups. These six shocks obscure potential speci…cation errors.
We parameterize the model using the coe¢ cient estimates provided by the posterior mean 5 How large is the discretionary stabilization bias?
Before looking at the e¤ects that imperfect credibility have on the model, we …rst quantify the magnitude of the stabilization bias for di¤erent values of . Following Dennis and Söderström (2006), we quantify the stabilization bias by calculating the percent gain in loss associated with having a commitment technology, which is given by
where V c and V d represent losses under commitment and discretion, respectively, and by calculating the in ‡ation equivalent (Jensen, 2002 ; Dennis and Söderström, 2006), which is given by
The interpretation of , the percent gain in loss associated with commitment is straightforward. However, as a measure of stabilization bias it su¤ers from the problem that where the losses under commitment and discretion are both small, large percentage gains can be attributed to commitment although the absolute di¤erence in losses is small. The in ‡ation equivalent measures the amount by which the central bank could permanently miss its in ‡ation target under commitment and still be no worse than discretion. Table 1 displays the losses under commitment and discretion, the percent gain from commitment, and the in ‡ation equivalent for a range of values for . Importantly, for all values of considered both the percent gain from commitment and the in ‡ation equivalent are large, signalling that the absence of commitment, by leading to a discretionary stabilization bias, has large e¤ects in the model. With equal to 0:25, the central bank could miss its in‡ation target by a full three percentage points under commitment and this outcome still be preferred to a discretionary equilibrium in which the in ‡ation target is hit on average. The …nding that stabilization bias is large in this model is consistent with Dennis and Söderström (2006) , who showed that the discretionary stabilization bias tends to be larger in models that lack transmission lags and in which expectations are formed using period-t information, both characteristics of the Smets-Wouters model. 
Robust policymaking with imperfect credibility
Where the analysis in Section 5 focused on the polar cases of commitment and discretion, we now turn to consider the e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness on policymaking.
Although there are six shocks in the model, in our analysis here we focus on the e¤ects of shocks to the price markup and to aggregate technology. In light of its policy objectives, the central bank always o¤sets the e¤ects of the shock to the neutral interest rate, and the qualitative story that emerges regarding the e¤ects of robustness and imperfect credibility on policymaking is consistent across the other three shocks.
The e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness on the response to price-markup shocks
For a range of assumptions about credibility, Figure 2 displays the responses of in ‡ation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate to a one-standard-deviation price-markup shock.
We focus on two types of impulse responses. The …rst type of impulse responses we denote These responses are equivalent to the Type III responses of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and they characterize the responses taking into account the fact that the tenure of today's policymaker will stochastically terminate. 3 The panels in the left-most column of Figure 2 (panels A, D, and G), show the (nonrobust) expected responses under commitment 4 and discretion and the within-regime and expected responses under imperfect credibility ( = 0:75). In response to the price markup shock, 3 Thus, where the Type I responses are conditioned upon a speci…c future sequence f s = 1g 1 s=t+1 , the Type III responses take all possible future sequences into account. 4 Of course, for a central bank that can commit the announced responses and the expected responses coincide.
in ‡ation rises (panel A) and a negative output gap opens up (Panel D). The negative output gap is somewhat larger when policy is conducted under commitment than under discretion, a consequence of the discretionary stabilization bias, which leads the discretionary policymaker to ine¢ ciently trade-o¤ movements in the output gap and in ‡ation. Looking now at the equilibrium responses according to the within regime policy, with = 0:75 the central bank announces a policy rule that implies that while its tenure continues it will implement a policy that tightens less rapidly (Panel G), but keeps interest rates higher for longer than the commitment policy. Thus, in order to stabilize in ‡ation the imperfectly credible central bank attempts to leverage the credibility it has by announcing that it will implements a policy during its tenure that is tighter for longer than the commitment policy. This result is consistent with Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2010), who also found that imperfectly credible central banks seek to leverage their credibility by making more extreme within-regime policy announcements. Interestingly, the expected policy looks qualitatively and quantitatively much more like the discretionary policy than the commitment policy, with the shock leading to a permanent increase in the price level. 6.2 The e¤ects of imperfect credibility and robustness on the response to technology shocks 
Is robustness a substitute for credibility?
It is well-known that commitment is superior to discretion and that higher credibility leads to With higher values of associated with less concern for model misspeci…cation, and with policy performance for a given measured relative to the benchmark in which the model is known to be correctly speci…ed, relative policy performance (V qc ( ; ) =V qc ( ; 1)) converges to one as rises to in…nity for all levels of credibility. Figure 4 shows that whether the equilibrium outcomes associated with the approximating equilibrium are superior or inferior to those associated with the nonrobust equilibrium depends on whether the central bank somewhat like a commitment mechanism even when policy is conducted under discretion. In addition, Figure 4 shows that a desire for robustness can act as a substitute for credibility and improve relative policy performance for most levels of credibility, and not just for pure discretion ( = 0). Indeed, only when credibility is very high-close to perfect-does the central bank's desire for robustness ever worsen policy performance.
How detectable are the speci…cation errors?
Our analysis of robust policymaking has assumed that the robustness parameter, , equals the threshold value, . This assumption expresses the idea that the central bank is as concerned as it can be about the approximating model while still holding the view that the approximating model is a useful approximation of the actual data-generating process. A consequence of this assumption is that the e¤ects of robustness on the impulse responses shown in Figures 2 and 3 cannot be made more damaging through a di¤erent-and more pessimistic-choice of . The fact that the e¤ects of model misspeci…cation appear small even with = may well imply that the Smets and Wouters (2007) model can be destabilized by relatively small speci…cation errors, even under a robust policy rule. Such a result would not be unexpected because it has been shown elsewhere that the performance of optimal policy rules, which exploit fully a model's structure, can be very poor when that structure is incorrect (Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 2003) , providing a popular argument for the use of optimized simple rules, which exploit less structure (McCallum, 1988) . With these issues in mind, here we ask the question of whether the central bank is likely to be able to detect the speci…cation errors and how their detection is a¤ected by imperfect credibility.
To explore this question we employ the notion of a detection-error probability that is promoted in a series of papers by Hansen and Sargent (see, for example, Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent, 2003) . A detection-error probability is the probability that an econometrician observing equilibrium outcomes would make an incorrect inference about whether the approximating equilibrium or the worst-case equilibrium generated the data. The intuitive connection between and the probability of making a detection error is that when is small, greater di¤erences between the distorted model and the approximating model (more severe misspeci…cations) can arise, which are more easily detected. In its top panel, Figure 5 displays the relationship between the (log of the) robustness parameter and the probability of making a detection error for discretion ( = 0:00), perfect credibility ( = 1:00), and imperfect credibility ( = 0:50). In its bottom panel, Figure 5 displays the relationship between the robustness parameter, , and the distortion budget, !, calculated according to equation (8) . Figure 5 . The relationship between detectability, the distortion budget, and credibility ( =0.25)
The following main results emerge from Figure 5 . First, the detection error probabilities and the distortions budgets associated with imperfect credibility are very similar to those for discretion, except when is close to one. Second, although the detection error probabilities are similar at the breakdown points, ! = ! ( ), these breakdown points are associated with very di¤erent distortion budgets. In particular, the distortion budget for = 1 is the smallest of those considered, suggesting that commitment policies are indeed more susceptible to model misspeci…cation. Together the two panels in Figure 5 suggest that the commitment policy is more fragile than the quasi-commitment policies, breaking down with smaller speci…cation errors, that the quasi-commitment policies behave similarly to the discretionary policy, and that the distortion budget is larger under discretion, which is consistent with the robustness results in Figures 2 and 3. 6.5 The e¤ect of a greater weight on output stabilization
The results above were obtained under the maintained assumption that the relative weight assigned to output stabilization in the policy objective function is = 0:25. To assess whether our results are qualitatively sensitive to this assumed value for we repeated the analysis, but under the maintained assumption that = 4:00, i.e., that the weight assigned to output stabilization is four times the weight assigned to in ‡ation stabilization. Although the nature of the impulse response functions do change, simply re ‡ecting the greater importance that the central bank places on output stabilization, the qualitative results do not change.
With the robustness parameter set to its threshold value, the e¤ects of robustness on the impulse response functions is relatively small, considerably smaller than the e¤ects of imperfect credibility. Further, the central bank's lack of credibility continues to motivate it to leverage what credibility it has by seeking to implement a within-regime policy response that is more extreme than that associated with perfect credibility. In addition, the central bank's desire for robustness continues to generate improved policy performance, except when credibility is close to perfect.
Conclusion
This paper has considered the decision problem facing an imperfectly credible central bank that seeks to conduct monetary policy using a model whose structure it has doubts about. A Appendix: Risk-sensitive preferences and robust control with quasi-commitment
We showed in Section 3 that the solution to the robust-control problem under discretion could equivalently be obtained from a formulation with risk-sensitive preferences. In this appendix we extend that result to establish a risk-sensitive formulation that is equivalent to the robustcontrol decision problem with quasi-commitment. One simplifying assumption that we make is that A 0 has full rank. Without loss of generality, then, we assume that A 0 = I. With this assumption, and assuming 2 (0; 1] (ruling out the discretionary case), the constraints according to the approximating model can be written as
while those according to the distorted model can be written as
where z t = x 0 t y 0 t 0 . To show the connection between the robust-control problem and the risk-sensitive preferences problem it is convenient to utilize the solution strategy of Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) which begins by treating z t , which contains nonpredetermined variables, as the state vector. Accordingly, the risk-sensitive preferences formulation takes the form 
where D e P = e P e PC I + C 0 e PC 1 C 0 e P:
In contrast, the robust control formulation of the decision problem is
where 0 and the constraints are given by equation (A2). Performing the inner maximization yields Following Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) the next step is to transform the solution from one depending on predetermined and nonpredetermined variables to one depending on predetermined and costate variables, where the latter are the analogue of the multipliers t 1 in the text. Accordingly, let t 1 = P 21 x t + P 22 y t ; where P 21 and P 22 are submatrices of P. Then the solution has H = P where prob(AjB) (prob(BjA)) represents the probability that the econometrician erroneously chooses A (B) when B (A) generated the data. Let fz B t g T 1 denote a …nite sequence of economic outcomes (the shocks, the shadow prices, the endogenous variables, and the followers' and leader's decision variables) generated by the worst-case equilibrium, and let L AB and L BB denote the likelihood associated with models A and B, respectively; then the econometrician chooses A over B if log(L BB =L AB ) < 0. Generating M independent sequences fz B t g T 1 , prob (AjB) can be calculated according to
where I[log (L m BB =L m AB ) < 0] is the indicator function that equals one when its argument is satis…ed and equals zero otherwise; prob(BjA) is calculated analogously using data generated from the approximating model. Let
govern equilibrium outcomes under the approximating equilibrium and the worst-case equilibrium, respectively. Using the Moore-Penrose inverse,
H i z j t ; fi; jg 2 fA; Bg are the inferred innovations in period t + 1 when model i is …tted to data fz j t g T 1 generated from model j, and let b ijj be the associated estimates of the innovation variance-covariance matrices. Note that the Moore-Penrose inverse picks out the shock process from among the variables in z t .
Assuming that the innovations are normally distributed, it is easy to show that
